Invisible hand at consumption-leisure production possibility frontier: the allocation of time between goods and services under wage and price dispersions. by Malakhov, Sergey
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Invisible hand at consumption-leisure
production possibility frontier: the
allocation of time between goods and
services under wage and price
dispersions.
Malakhov, Sergey
1 December 2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/104455/
MPRA Paper No. 104455, posted 05 Dec 2020 13:31 UTC
	 1	
Sergey MALAKHOV 
Ph.D., Applied Economics,1998, 
Pierre-Mendès-France University 
 (Université Grenoble-Alpes), France 
 
Invisible Hand at Consumption-Leisure Production Possibility Frontier: 
the allocation of time between goods and services under wage and price dispersions. 
 
Abstract 
If the equilibrium price is equal to the lowest willingness to pay of consumers with zero 
search costs, it accumulates under price dispersion the willingness to sell of consumers with 
positive search costs. The searcher buys optimally at a low price, which equalizes marginal costs 
of his search with its marginal benefit and maximizes his consumption-leisure utility but now 
with respect to the equilibrium price. The suboptimal satisficing purchases represent corner 
solutions; consumers either buy optimally or quit the market. 
The producer meets the consumer with a price, like he knows in advance his willingness 
to pay and the time spent on search. The consumption-leisure production possibility frontier 
optimally allocates his time between production and delivery; it determines not only the quantity 
to be purchased and the price, but also the meeting point, where the producer stops consumer’s 
search and sells him goods with leisure. Being unaware of how much the consumer has spent on 
labor and search, the producer unintentionally optimizes his consumption-leisure choice. 
 
Key words: invisible hand, consumption-leisure choice, production possibility frontier, search, 
price dispersion 
JEL classification: D11, D83. 
 
Introduction 
The voluminous literature on the Invisible hand can be divided into three general threads: 
the skeptical, regarding this famous notion as the metaphor (Stiglitz 2002, Schlefer 2012); the 
enthusiastic, recognizing its role in the analysis of the self-interested individual behavior (Stigler 
1976, Sen 2009); and the teleological, if not theological, based on Adam Smith’s religious 
background (Macfie 2003, Oslington 2012). 
The enthusiastic approach to the most famous allegory of the economic thought is owing 
to the continued interest in inner workings of the market in itself. Indeed, “the view that 
competitive equilibria have some special optimality properties is at least as old as Adam Smith’s 
invisible hand…” (Arrow 1985, p.110).  
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The transformation of the classical consumer labor-leisure choice into the labor-search-
leisure choice discovers some optimality properties of imperfect markets and their potentials to 
the self-organization under price dispersion (Malakhov 2018). This methodological comeback to 
the basic principles of microeconomics is explained by the recent trends in the economics of 
search. Its fundamental results had been successfully documented by two comprehensive 
overviews (Baye et al. 2006, McCall and McCall 2008). And during last years the economics of 
search has been developed in the very promising direction of matching modeling; the issue that 
seems to be very important in the understanding of the inner coherence of the economy. 
However, sometimes the outcomes of this research thread look to a large extent instrumental, 
paying attention to particular attributes of the matching process like matching stability (Liu et al. 
2014), meeting technologies (Lester et al. 2014), or sorting through search (Chade et al. 2017).  
The instrumental approach to the search and matching pays more attention to active 
buyers and sellers, and less attention to the potentials of the market in resources allocation where 
time remains the most important input. The labor-search-leisure model demonstrates how the 
search is rewarded by the purchase price, which provides the optimal allocation of consumers’ 
time between labor, search, and leisure. However, the efficient search doesn’t mean that active 
consumers calculate marginal values of his efforts. When they follow the simple ‘it’s enough to 
spend time’ rule, the marginal values of search become automatically equated. It looks like the 
producer who is unaware of consumers’ allocation of time comes to the right place at the right 
time with the ‘just price’, which unintentionally maximizes the consumption-leisure utility 
function (Malakhov 2020b). However, the question how the producer invariably comes there 
remains the open issue for qualitative assessment of the inner market mechanism, presented 
literarily by Adam Smith: “he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other 
cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention” (Smith 
1976, Wealth of Nations, p.456). 
This paper tries to answer to this question. The analysis of the Invisible hand is organized 
as follows. 
Part I starts with the presentation of the behavioral labor-search-leisure choice. The 
behavioral explicit choice model is transformed into the implicit consumption-leisure utility 
maximization model. The paper tries to minimize the cumbersome examination of marginal 
values of search, used earlier in the labour-search-leisure model. Here, the analysis of the 
consumption-leisure utility is levelled up to absolute values, which facilitate the presentation of 
the inner coherence of the market. 
Part II presents the particular consumption-leisure production possibility frontier. The 
paper argues that producers, delivering goods to some point of sale, provide not only 
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consumption but also leisure time, and their simple self-interested decisions result in the 
maximization of customers’ consumption-leisure utility. 
Part III pays attention to home production and dual activities. When the time horizon 
until next purchase is divided between labor, search, and leisure, home production represents a 
specific form of search where consumers search low prices for inputs with respect to the market 
value of finished goods. When the home production provides some pleasure, it becomes a dual 
activity where the willingness to pay depends on the leisure-search trade-off like it happens in 
pleasurable shopping that takes place in boutiques. 
 
Part I. Labor-search-leisure model 
If we start with the traditional problem of search for the fixed quantity demanded Q 
(Stigler 1961), we get the intersection of QP(S) curve and labour income wL(S) curve with 
regard to the time of search S: 
Fig.1. Behavioral optimal search 
where S – the search; L – labor; H – leisure; T – time horizon until next purchase; Q – quantity 
demanded; w – wage rate; wL0 – willingness to pay; PP – purchase price. 
The straight line with the slope w, passing the intersection point, i.e., the purchase, gives 
us the QP0 value on the 0Y axis and (S+L) value on the 0X axis. The straight dotted line from the 
point QP0 with the slope (-Q∂P/∂S), i.e., the tangent to the moment of purchase, gives us the 
value of the time horizon T on the 0X axis.  
These considerations result in the following equation: 
𝑤 𝐿 + 𝑆 = −𝑄
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑆
𝑇 = 𝑄𝑃!                                                              (1) 
S*
wL
0
QPp
T
QP(S)
QP
0
L
wL(S)
−Q∂P / ∂Sw
H X
Y
0
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         The behavioral model of the optimal search uses the assumption of the diminishing 
efficiency of the search or ∂
2
P/∂S
2
>0. However, the shape of the labor cost curve ∂
2
wL/∂S
2
<0 
can and should be proved.  
 Let’s take Eq.1 as the budget constraint to some consumption-leisure utility function 
U(Q,H), keeping in mind that for the given time horizon T=L+S+H the value ∂L/∂H+∂S/∂H=-1: 
ℒ = 𝑈 𝑄,𝐻 + 𝜆 𝑤 𝐿 + 𝑆 − 𝑄𝑃!                                                     (2.1) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝑄
=
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑄
− 𝜆𝑃! = 0                                                                                (2.2) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕𝐻
=
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐻
+ 𝜆𝑤
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝐻
+
𝜕𝑆
𝜕𝐻
=
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝐻
− 𝜆𝑤 = 0                                  (2.3) 
𝜕𝑈/𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝑈/𝜕𝑄
= 𝑀𝑅𝑆 𝐻 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑄 =
𝑤
𝑃!
                                                         (2.4) 
 
For the moment this utility function looks implicit because here the value of consumption 
Q becomes a variable, and value of price reduction ∂P/∂S stays constant (Fig.2):  
Fig.2. Consumption-leisure utility 
where S – search; L – labor; H
*
 – leisure; T – time horizon until next purchase; Q
*
 – quantity 
purchased; U
*
 - consumption-leisure utility. 
However, its implicit optimal solution, where the fixed ∂P/∂S value displays the given 
place of purchase, matches the optimal explicit behavioral choice when the variable ∂P/∂S value 
exhibits a sequential search. There, the search really becomes optimal because Eq.1 also 
provides the equality of its marginal values at the purchase price level:
1
 
𝑄𝑃! = −𝑄
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑆
𝑇 = 𝑤 𝐿 + 𝑆                                                          (3.1) 
																																																								
1
 The equation of the marginal values of search (3.2) is used as the constraint in the basic labour-search-leisure 
model where it produces very specific values of the marginal utility, which nevertheless give the same results 
H
*
H
Q*
Q
w(L+S)
P
0
=−
w
∂P /∂S
U *
TS+L
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𝑄
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑆
= −𝑤
𝐿 + 𝑆
𝑇
= 𝑤 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑆
                                                             (3.2) 
 
While the value of the marginal benefit on purchase Q∂P/∂S is widely used in economics 
either with respect to the units of search (Stigler 1961) or to the time of search (Aguiar and Hurst 
2007b), the value of the marginal costs looks rather unusual. Here, it is equal to the wage rate 
times the propensity to search ∂L/∂S. This is the key variable of the labor-search-leisure model. 
The propensity to search provides the optimal allocation of time in the explicit behavioral model 
and the maximization of the implicit consumption-leisure utility. But its value comes from the 
simple natural reasoning. When we fill the glass (time horizon) with whiskey (labor) and soda 
(leisure), an ice cube (search) spills the drink over the edge of the glass. The volume of the 
spilled soda is equal to the volume of the ice cube times the soda’s share in the glass or 
𝑑𝐻 𝑆 = −𝑑𝑆
𝐻
𝑇
= 𝑑𝑆
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝑆
                                                              (4.1) 
𝐿 + 𝑆 + 𝐻 = 𝑇!"#$%;
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑆
+ 1+
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝑆
= 0                                        (4.2) 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑆
= −1+
𝐻
𝑇
= −
𝐿 + 𝑆
𝑇
                                                               (4.3) 
 
Now it is easy to show with Eq.4.3 that the derivative of the value of the propensity to 
search ∂L/∂S, when1<∂L/∂S<0, is negative, or ∂
2
L/∂S
2
<0.
2
 
The logic of the behavioral model takes the value of time horizon as the time until next 
purchase. The analysis of the propensity to search shows that the value of the time horizon 
doesn’t appear accidental in the behavioral search model. It really gives a consumer some leisure 
time to enjoy the item. However, the time horizon is often pre-determined by some calendar. If it 
takes place, the Eq.1 is ceasing to be unconditioned. 
The confirmation of the reliability of the budget constraint (Eq.1) needs some algebraic 
manipulations. First, we rearrange it to get the physic trade-off between leisure and 
consumption: 
𝑤 𝐿 + 𝑆 = 𝑄𝑃! ⇒
𝑤
𝑃!
=
𝑄
𝐿 + 𝑆
= 𝑀𝑅𝑆 (𝐻 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑄)                                     (5) 
 
																																																								
2
 While the value ∂L/∂S is always negative because labour and search represent alternative sources of income, it 
might come to ∂L/∂S<-1. Here the consumption-leisure choice occurs under the leisure model of behaviour where 
the positive leisure-search relationship ∂H/∂S>0 results in positive ∂Q/∂H trade-off, which produces negative 
marginal utilities and anomalies like Veblen effect. But when it happens, the natural analogy with the whiskey, soda, 
and ice doesn’t work. The economic choice looses its natural grounds, and the Invisible hand becomes helpless 
(Malakhov 2018). 
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If the consumer early stops the search, its marginal costs will be less than its marginal 
benefit. The inequality of the marginal values of search at the purchase price level results in the 
corner solution at the equilibrium price level:  
−𝑤
𝐿 + 𝑆
𝑇
> 𝑄
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑆
                                                                         (6.1) 
𝑤 𝐿 + 𝑆 < 𝑄
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑆
𝑇 = 𝑄𝑃!                                                      (6.2) 
𝑤
𝑃!
<
𝑄
𝐿 + 𝑆
                                                                                  (6.3) 
 
Theoretically, this situation cannot take place at the moment of purchase. If we come 
back to the moment of the intention to buy when the fridge is empty (𝑄, 𝐿, 𝑆 → 0;𝑇const), 
l’Hôpital rule gives us the following result: 
lim
!→!
𝑄(𝐻) = lim
!→!
𝐿 + 𝑆 𝐻 = 0;
𝜕(𝐿 + 𝑆)
𝜕𝐻
|!!"#$% = −1                      (7.1) 
lim
!→!
𝜕𝑄/𝜕𝐻
𝜕(𝐿 + 𝑆)/𝜕𝐻
= −
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝐻
= lim
!→!
𝑄
𝐿 + 𝑆
                                    (7.2) 
 
And we get the unit elasticity of cost on purchase with respect to consumption: 
𝑒! !!! ,! =
𝜕(𝐿 + 𝑆)
𝜕𝑄
𝑄
𝐿 + 𝑆
|!!;!!;!!→!;!!"#$% =
𝜕(𝑇 − 𝐻)
𝜕𝑄
𝑄
𝐿 + 𝑆
= −
𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝑄
−
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝐻
= 1    (8) 
We see that the consumer doesn’t make cumbersome calculations of marginal values. He 
needs from the very beginning only the realistic evaluation of his purchasing power and his 
efforts w/P0=Q/L+S. If the consumer overestimates the value of his efforts from the very 
beginning, finally he finds himself ‘in the corner’. And he should either quit the market or accept 
its rules; he adjusts his aspirations and spends more efforts on purchase. But if this starting 
evaluation is realistic, he buys optimally with respect to Eq.8 any quantity, which automatically 
equalizes the marginal values of his search. The consumer follows the ‘it’s enough to spend 
time’ rule and stops the search when total efforts on purchase, both on labour and search, 
correspond to the quantity purchased. He looks satisficing but his purchase is optimal because 
the purchase price optimizes his allocation of time (Malakhov 2020b). 
This unit elasticity rule illustrates the stability of preferences. But in our case it means 
that Eq.6.3 cannot take place at the moment of purchase. The inequality of the marginal values 
of search, i.e., the corner solution, appears at the moment of the intention to buy when the 
consumer doesn’t even start to work and to search because the quantity demanded isn’t worth 
money and efforts. 
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Nevertheless, the comparative statics can produce such inequality. It happens when the 
arbitrage at the zero search level takes place. 
The consumer starts the search with the willingness to pay WTP=wL0. When he buys at a 
low price, he gets an option either to consume or to re-sell the item. If he sells it, the resale price 
will be equal to his costs w(L+S). And we can consider this value as his willingness to accept or 
to sell (Fig.3): 
  
Fig.3.Suboptimal behavioral choice 
This particular WTP-WTA relationship becomes more clear when we take the home 
production as a specific form of the search. Indeed, “the opportunity cost of time of the shopper 
is the same as that of the person undertaking home production.” (Aguiar and Hurst 2007b, 
p.1594). While the time horizon is divided between labor, search, and leisure, the search 
represents any activity, which decreases the purchase price. The consumer can buy the grilled 
steak in the restaurant, or he can make it at home. There, his WTP is limited by the price of 
inputs, while his WTA goes up with the market price of grilled steak. Theoretically, and 
sometimes it happens in real life, the skilled consumer can sell the output of home production to 
his neighbor who hasn’t time for home production because his opportunity costs are higher. 
Here we come to the understanding of the nature of QP0 value. The economics of search 
had successfully developed for a long time the concept of consumers’ heterogeneity (Diamond 
1987). It describes shoppers, consumers with zero search costs, and searchers, consumers with 
positive search costs (Stahl 1989).  
Now we understand that the QP0 value represents the willingness to pay of shoppers who 
have no time to search. But the zero search level has a specific attribute – even if shoppers have 
different opportunity costs of time, i.e., different willingness to pay, there is no price dispersion 
at this level, since otherwise some shoppers become searchers. It means that the QP0 value is 
S
wL
0
=WTP
QPp
T
QP(S)
QP
0
L+S
wL(S)
−Q∂P / ∂Sw
w(L+S)=WTA
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equal to the lowest willingness to pay among shoppers. The P0 value is the equilibrium price or 
P0=Pe.  
And the consumer can use it. If he decides to re-sell the bought item, he becomes a 
‘producer’ who bears some costs. And his costs, both average and marginal, really come to the 
equilibrium level: 
𝑤 𝐿 + 𝑆 = 𝑄𝑃! =𝑊𝑇𝐴                                                               (9.1) 
𝑤(𝐿 + 𝑆)
𝑄
= 𝐴𝐶 =
𝜕𝑤(𝐿 + 𝑆)
𝜕𝑄
= 𝑀𝐶 = 𝑃! = 𝑃!                                           (9.2) 
However, if the consumer is smart and skilled, his costs might be lower than the 
equilibrium level WTA=w(L+S)<QPe. The lower price appears at the zero search level. The 
arbitrage process starts, and it finishes with the new equilibrium price. It means that former 
suboptimal purchases now become optimal. New equilibrium price equalizes marginal values of 
search and corner solutions disappear. 
 
Part II. Consumption-leisure production possibility frontier 
The unit elasticity rule (Eq.8) tells us that if the consumer realistically estimates the 
efficiency of his efforts at the moment of the intention to buy (MRS0 (H for Q)=Q/L+S=w/Pe) , 
he optimally buys any quantity. It means that the producer appears on the market with the 
quantity and price that being summarized with consumer’s search costs produce the optimal 
purchase. The producer comes to the right place at the right time with the ‘just price’ and 
optimizes intentionally by QPp=wL value the allocation of consumer’s time horizon and 
maximizes his consumption-leisure utility. It looks like the producer knows in what manner the 
consumer allocates his time. But if the producer is unaware of it, all the composition becomes 
really enigmatic.  
Let’s take a simplified example of the producer who allocates his time between farming 
and delivery. There are two extreme cases where he is not concerned about the consumer’s 
allocation of time - when he sells “door to door”, to a high-income shopper with zero search 
costs, and at his site, the farm, for example, to a low-income searcher coming there from the 
downtown. But between these two extremes there is a middle-income customer who is not ready 
to pay the price at ‘the door’ and to go to ‘the farm.’ And the question what price and point of 
sale the producer should to choose for him remains open. 
When the producer’s total working time is constant, his total costs TC(Q) are also 
constant. The producer chooses the target quantity demanded Q and gets the price P on the basis 
of his average costs AC. His total costs become proportional to output. It means that his 
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production function exhibits constant return to scale both for farming f and delivery d. And their 
average and marginal costs become equal:  
𝑇𝐶 𝑄 = 𝑎𝑄;𝑎 = 𝐴𝐶 = 𝑀𝐶                                                       (10.1) 
𝑃 = 𝐴𝐶 = 𝐴𝐶! + 𝐴𝐶! = 𝑀𝐶 = 𝑀𝐶! +𝑀𝐶!                                0.2) 
𝐴𝐶! = 𝑀𝐶!;𝐴𝐶! = 𝑀𝐶!                                                                (10.3) 
The delivery from the farm to some point of sale increases the consumer’s leisure time H 
but reduces the output Q. It means that the consumers’ leisure is not costless for the seller. But 
when he is unaware of the consumers’ allocation of time ‘the price of consumer’s leisure’ for 
him is equal to its opportunity costs, i.e., marginal costs of delivery: 
𝑀𝐶! = 𝑀𝐶!"                                                                               (12) 
Now we can construct some virtual production possibility frontier, limited by two 
extremes – by ‘the farm’ and ‘the door’ (Fig.4): 
 
Fig.4. Consumption-leisure production possibility frontier 
Along this virtual frontier the farmer produces and sells not only goods. He also trades 
consumers’ leisure. For consumers, any point on this frontier represents the w/Pe ratio with 
respect to their wage rates. It is low at ‘the farm’ and high at ‘the door.’ Low-income consumers 
spend much time on search and the high-income consumers don’t search at all. But for the 
producer any point of the PPF represents a particular combination of his time spent on the farm 
and on his way to the point of sale. But when the costs of leisure are equal to the costs of 
delivery, the rate of product transformation RPT (Qd for Qf) looks as follows: 
𝑑𝑇𝐶 𝑄,𝐻 = 𝑑𝑄
𝜕𝑇𝐶
𝜕𝑄
+ 𝑑𝐻
𝜕𝑇𝐶
𝜕𝐻
= 0                                     (13.1) 
−
𝑑𝑄
𝑑𝐻
=
𝜕𝑇𝐶 𝜕𝐻
𝜕𝑇𝐶 𝜕𝑄
                                                                          (13.2) 
H
Q
Q
farm
Q
door
H
farm
H
door
U
searchers
U
shoppers
PPF
T
door
T
farm
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 𝑑𝑇𝐶 𝐻 = 𝑑𝐻
𝜕𝑇𝐶
𝜕𝐻
= 𝑑𝑇𝐶(𝑄!) = 𝑑𝑄!
𝜕𝑇𝐶
𝜕𝑄!
                       (13.3) 
𝑑𝑇𝐶 𝑄 = 𝑑𝑄!
𝜕𝑇𝐶
𝜕𝑄!
+ 𝑑𝑄!
𝜕𝑇𝐶
𝜕𝑄!
= 0                                     (13.3) 
−
𝑑𝑄!
𝑑𝑄!
=
𝜕𝑇𝐶 𝜕𝑄!
𝜕𝑇𝐶 𝜕𝑄!
=
𝑀𝐶!
𝑀𝐶!
= 𝑅𝑃𝑇                                       (13.4) 
where Qf – goods in farming; Qd – goods in delivery 
When the constant total costs’ function is convex with respect to the price-quantity trade-
off, it becomes concave with respect to the trade-off ‘goods in farming – goods in delivery.’ The 
PPF is concave because goods in farming and goods in delivery exhibit constant returns to scale 
but only with respect to the target consumption level Q. Farming and delivery use time in 
different proportions but these proportions change over the frontier; the supply to the ‘door’ 
becomes more time intensive as well as the production on the ‘farm’ needs more time per unit 
because of the expansion of the ‘cultivated’ area. And the set of production function with respect 
to different output levels looks as follows (Fig.5): 
Fig.5. The set of production functions under constant total costs of  
the production possibility frontier 
So, the choice of the point of sale changes both the output and its price. The sale on the 
farm with regard to the downtown raises the output as well as its marginal costs of production 
MCf but its marginal costs of delivery MCd, i.e., of leisure, MCH, fall.
3
 
Here the producer is not concerned about the total leisure time. Only leisure between ‘the 
door’ and ‘the farm’ is traded. Any consumer has an option to go to the farm where he keeps in 
anyway some leisure time. But he can buy a little more leisure to avoid going there. 
																																																								
3
 As we can see at Fig.4, the high wage rate reduces the time horizon until next purchase. This consideration 
corresponds to the statistics on the shopping frequency with respect to income (Kunst 2019). 
TC
Q
PQ=TC
PPF
Q
farm
Q
door
Q
demanded
AC
farm
=MC
farm
=P
farm
TC
farm
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It means that the re-allocation of time between farming and delivery meets once some 
optimal consumer’s choice: 
−
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝐻
=
𝑀𝐶!
𝑀𝐶!
=
𝑀𝐶!
𝑀𝐶!
=
𝑤
𝑃!
=
𝑄
𝐿 + 𝑆
                                           (14) 
In this way the equilibrium simplifies the farmer’s decision-making. The RPT (Qd for 
Qf)=MRS (H for Q) is equal under the constant return to scale with respect to the quantity 
demanded Q to the ‘time in farming’ – time in delivery’ Td/Tf ratio: 
𝑄
𝐿 + 𝑆
=
𝑤
𝑃!
=
𝑀𝐶!
𝑀𝐶!
=
𝐴𝐶!
𝐴𝐶!
=
𝑇𝐶!
𝑇𝐶!
=
𝑇!
𝑇!
                                      (15) 
The farmer knows his productivity on the farm; he takes the target quantity Q and gets 
the time in farming Tf. And the time in delivery Td appears as the residual value with respect to 
the total working time. He spends time in delivery Td and comes to the meeting point where he 
finds the consumer who has spent some time on search S. 
We see that this matching occurs almost automatically. And it really looks like the work 
of the Invisible hand. The ‘just price’ adds to its mystique by meeting the consumer’s wishes. 
There is no doubt that the producer has set the price, which unintentionally optimizes the buyer’s 
allocation of time and maximizes the utility of his consumption-leisure choice. When the total 
output is sold, sales are equal to the labor income spent on the purchase where the price is the 
same for both parts: 
𝑃𝑄 = 𝑤𝐿 ⇒ 𝑃 =
𝑤𝐿
𝑄
                                                                          (16) 
This ‘just price’ confirms the successful matching because it stays from the very 
beginning on the production possibility frontier. When the producer is going to the meeting 
point, he can be stopped by some consumers with a proposal to sell them his output. But this 
occasional meeting cannot be optimal to the producer because consumers who have spent more 
time on search don’t give him the price he is expecting. And he rejects the proposal and 
continues his way to ‘his’ consumer (Fig.6): 
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Fig.6. Suboptimal and optimal sale 
The price P for the given quantity Q uniquely identifies the allocation (Td;Tf) of total 
producer’s time. If he is more productive, he will spend less time on the farm but more on 
delivery. And the producer will comer closer to the potential buyer. The production possibility 
frontier will change its shape and establish the new equilibrium trade-off Td/Tf equal to the 
consumption-leisure trade-off of the consumer who stays ‘in the corner’ with higher labor time L 
and lower search time S under ∂
2
L/∂S
2
<0 rule. He is ready to pay higher price, and it really will 
become higher because of greater productivity and closer delivery. Being unaware that they have 
launched the arbitrage process, both parts will be satisfied by the good trade. 
However, the farmer can overestimate the value of his efforts. But then he should either 
quit the market or accept its rules, like a consumer does it in ‘the corner.’ The game theory 
describes ‘satisficing sellers’ who adjust their aspiration levels (Berninghaus et al. 2011). 
However, like consumers’ satisficing decisions become optimal (Malakhov 2020b), here the 
sellers’ satisficing decisions become optimal, now with respect to their actual market value of 
producer’s efforts, i.e., to the price. And the suboptimal sale on Fig.6 becomes optimal with 
respect to lower value of producer’s efforts and lower production possibility frontier. 
The producer also can make a mistake in evaluating the target consumption level Q. But 
here he can rely only on his commercial skills and talents. 
The last consideration opens the way from the short run analysis of one trade to the long 
run analysis when the farmer makes sales regularly. The analysis of long run decisions needs 
many specifications that go beyond the scope of this paper. But it can contribute to the 
understanding of the basic principles of long-term relationships. The Equations (10.2) and (14) 
result in the following consideration: 
𝑃 = 𝑀𝐶! +𝑀𝐶! = 𝑀𝐶! 1+
𝑤
𝑃!
                                            (16.1) 
TH
*
H
Q
Q*
E	
H
sub
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𝑤
𝑃!
=
𝑃 −𝑀𝐶!
𝑀𝐶!
=
𝑃 − 𝐴𝐶!
𝐴𝐶!
= 𝑚                                                  (16.2) 
where m is the sales markup. 
The long-term relationships need the trust. Here the trust is provided by the Equation 
(16.2). The trader cannot earn more than his customers. At the equilibrium his sales markup is 
equal to the consumers’ purchasing power. But the seller doesn’t get money for nothing. He is 
selling his skills and experience like the customer gets wages also for his skills and experience. 
We see that for both short and long run decisions the producer’s knowledge is very 
limited. In the long run he needs the information about the purchasing power. And in the short 
run he doesn't need the information even about the consumer’s willingness to pay. The only 
thing he needs is the quantity demanded. 
These considerations confirm the assumption made once by Kenneth Arrow: 
“The notion of the inner coherence of the economy – the way markets and the pursuit of 
self-interest could in principle achieve a major degree of coordination without any explicit 
exchange of information, but where the results may diverge significantly from those intended by 
the individual actors – is surely the most important intellectual contribution that economic 
thought has made to the general understanding of social processes.” (Arrow, op.cit., p.108). 
 
Part III. Home production and dual activity 
When Eugen Slutsky wrote his notes on the theory of the marginal utility, he paid 
particular attention to the difference between trade units and consumption units (Slutsky 2010). 
The labor-search-leisure model definitely needs that distinction because it becomes very 
important at the zero search level. If we look at the automobile market, the consumption unit that 
shoppers can buy there without efforts is the mile in the taxicab. It becomes the equilibrium price 
on the market where vehicles are traded with regard to their expected mileage. The purchase of a 
car turns into the acquisition of input when driving becomes a specific form of home production, 
here the ‘production of miles.’ As a result, independent taxi drivers can make the efficient 
arbitrage at the zero search level with respect to their willingness to accept (Malakhov 2019). 
However, the driving can be pleasurable. Here we come to the problem of dual activity. 
There are some activities like gardening and pets’ care that can be classified as both leisure and 
home production because these activities provide direct utility but are also something one can 
purchase on the market (Aguiar and Hurst 2007a). The search also can be purchased on the 
market, for example, when house buyers and tourists hire agents to find the property and leisure 
they need. The shopping can be either tedious, when consumers buy necessities in malls, or 
pleasurable, when they leisurely observe windows in the downtown. But it doesn’t mean that we 
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should evaluate a specific utility of the search. The labour-search-leisure model solves this 
problem with the help of the value of the propensity to search. When the search is pleasurable, 
consumers easily substitutes leisure for it, and their high willingness to pay remains almost 
unchanged, while the tedious search significantly cuts the willingness to pay because here the 
leisure stays almost unchanged. And it happens on the market of ‘lemons’ where bad cars can be 
valued as necessities while good cars as luxuries and sellers of good cars don’t quit the market 
(Malakhov 2019). 
While both the problems of consumption units and dual activities have been well studied 
by the characteristic model approach (Lancaster 1966) and the economics of time, the labour-
search-leisure optics opens the way to the more profound analysis of these phenomena. Further 
study can lead to the review of the traditional dilemma ‘to produce or to buy,’ but even under 
such reconsiderations it will confirm the basic principles of the division of labour, chosen by 
Adam Smith as the cornerstone for his Wealth of Nations. 
 
Conclusion 
The labour-search-leisure model demonstrates how both buyers and sellers, following 
simple decision rules, can meet each other on the imperfect market. From the theoretical point of 
view, the producer fails only if he overestimates the value of his efforts – the same mistake the 
consumer makes when he comes ‘to the corner.’ 
Actually, if producers and consumers don’t make correct estimations of their efforts, then 
imperfect markets keep them spending more time to meet each other. Their matching is ceasing 
to be frictionless. However, the labor-search-leisure model doesn’t claim to justify some 
matching rule; it discovers the potentials of the market to enable the matching process. Although 
this presentation is academic, it underlies many practical decisions like the common 
greengrocer’s choice of the place for his store with respect to the purchasing power in the area 
where the target income group is living. There, he gets his gains and makes residents happy in a 
way Adam Smith was speaking about. 
The introduction of different productivity on production itself and delivery doesn’t 
change the logic of the model. There, the results would be reconsidered under the assumptions 
either of the labour advanced or services advanced technological progresses where services 
present vehicles that provide consumers’ leisure (Malakhov 2020a).  
The limited scope of this paper leaves many questions in abeyance, first of all the study 
of long-run decisions when the point of sale is transformed into a store on a local market where 
the purchase price becomes a ‘just price’ because it equalizes the seller’s markup with the local 
consumer’s purchasing power. 
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But even in its limited scope the paper provides grounds for the conclusion that the 
competitive equilibrium can exist without any explicit exchange of information under price 
dispersion where both sellers and buyers suffer from transaction costs. 
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